Με δεδομένη την μεγάλη ανάγκη της Ελλάδος για δανεισμό και τα υψηλά spread, κατέστη σαφές ότι οι κυβερνήσεις της ευρωζώνης, στις αρχές Μαΐου, είχαν δύο επιλογές. Την άμεση χρεωκοπία της Ελλάδος ἤ πακέτο βοηθείας το οποίο θα μπορούσε να καθυστερήσει το αναπόφευκτο για λίγα χρόνια.

Η Γαλλία και η Γερμανία έχουν μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον να αποφύγουν την χρεωκοπία της Ελλάδος για όσο το δυνατόν μεγαλύτερο χρονικό διάστημα. Οι απαιτήσεις των γαλλικών τραπεζών έναντι της Ελλάδος ανέρχονται κατά προσέγγιση, σε 80 δις $, ενώ των γερμανικών σε 45 δις $. Αντιθέτως οι απαιτήσεις των αγγλικών τραπεζών φθάνουν τα 15 δις $. Πρό του κινδύνου της αμέσου καταρρεύσεως των γαλλογερμανικών τραπεζών ἤ της διατηρήσεως της αξιοπιστίας της Ελλάδος με καθυστέρηση της χρεωκοπίας της έως ότου βελτιωθεί η διεθνής οικονομική κατάσταση, η Γερμανία και η Γαλλία επέλεξαν το δεύτερο.

Παρατηρήστε στον πίνακα που ακολουθεί πόσο ήταν το χρέος της χώρας το 2009 και πόσο θα είναι το 2015.

Είναι βέβαιο λοιπόν, με βάση όσα προηγουμένως εκθέσαμε, ότι η κυβέρνηση του κ. Παπανδρέου ανάλαβε την υποχρέωση να

α) να διασφαλίσει τις απαιτήσεις των γερμανικών, γαλλικών κλπ τραπεζών και

β) να οδηγήσει εν συνεχεία την χώρα σε ελεγχόμενη χρεωκοπία.

Παραθέτουμε χαρακτηριστικά αποσπάσματα ( στην αγγλική ) από το έγγραφο του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου :

The IMF “forecasts” the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio to begin to fall after 2014 under its IMF financing program, but this is under the assumption that Greece is able to run to run primary surpluses of about six percent of GDP. The Fund (2010) is not optimistic, saying “Risks to the program are high. The adjustment needs are unprecedented and will take time, so fatigue could set in. Any unforeseen shock could weigh on the economy and the banking system, even if the fiscal program is on track.”

Even this gloomy IMF forecast is viewed as sanguine by some. Boone and Johnson (2010) think that Greek debt may rise to 155 percent of GDP. To see the implications of such a large debt burden, suppose that Greece were to experience constant real growth of γ and that it faced a constant real interest rate of r. Let Greek debt (as a percentage of GDP) be denoted by b. The primary surplus (as a percentage of GDP) necessary to maintain a constant level of debt is approximately

s = (r – γ)b.

As long as the real interest rate that Greece pays exceeds its growth rate, Greek debt will grow unless Greece runs a sufficiently large primary surplus. Boone and Johnson point out that if Greece has zero growth and pays a real interest rate of five percent, it would have to run primary surpluses of nearly eight percent of GDP each year, just to keep its debt from growing as a percentage of GDP.

Given the inefficiency of the Greek tax system, running sizable primary surpluses would require savage cuts in public spending. Even when the Greek economy was growing rapidly, Greece did not have the political will to run surpluses. Currently, Greece has a large budget deficit and is dependent on borrowing: it has an incentive to accept the IMF’s conditionality and to promise reform in return for funding. However, as Buiter (2010) points out, were it to commence running primary surpluses, then Greece would not need current funding. At this point, default is likely to seem preferable to years of austerity. Thus, political considerations suggest that Greece is currently insolvent.

THE EUROSYSTEM HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DEFAULT AND LENDING TO GREECE

Given the spike in the Greek – German government bond spread and short-term Greek borrowing needs, it was clear in early May that euro area governments were faced with a choice between immediate Greek default or a rescue package that might stave off the inevitable for a few years.
No advanced economy has defaulted in the last 50 years but transition and developing economies default fairly regularly.
1 Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina and Uruguay have all defaulted since 1998, paying average haircuts of 13 – 73 percent in the resulting debt restructurings.
2 Eventually, Greece is likely to want to default with a preemptive restructuring of its government debt. Once it is no longer running a significant primary budget deficit, the cost of a default is likely to be less than the cost of years of running primary surpluses. The empirical evidence suggests that countries that default are not denied access to international financial markets, although they may pay a somewhat higher cost for borrowing than those that do not.
3 In the short run, however, Greece is anxious to avoid default. With sizable government budget deficits planned for this year and next, default would lead to output losses and social unrest if the government were unable to borrow. Domestic banks are major creditors of the government and they would be threatened with insolvency. France and Germany are also especially interested in avoiding default for as long as possible. Their banks are heavily exposed to Greek debt. According to the BIS, French bank claims on Greece amount to nearly $80 billion; German bank claims amount to about $45 billion. In contrast, UK banks have claims of only around $15 billion. Faced with the choice between bailing out their banks right away, or keeping Greece solvent and delaying a bailout until the global economic situation has improved, Germany and France appear to view the latter action as preferable.
It is worth noting, as an aside, that French and German banks should not have been allowed to become so heavily exposed to Greek debt. This is a supervisory and regulatory failure on the parts of the French and German governments.

http://filotimia.blogspot.com/2010/12/blog-post_10.html